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Abstract

This project focuses on the philosophy of Yakov Druskin and its applicability as a lens
through which to examine the metaphysical and religious elements of chinari literature. Formed
in Leningrad at the dawn of the Soviet Union, the group of authors and philosophers known as
the chinari has long been recognized as an important component of the Russian avant-garde.
However, the role of religion and spirituality in their works remains under-examined, despite the
fact that the group featured a prolific religious philosopher, Yakov Druskin. By exploring a
selection of Druskin’s philosophical concepts and applying them to major chinari texts—Daniil
Kharms’ “The Old Woman” and Alexander Vvedensky’s “God May be All Around”—I argue
that Druskin helps us look beyond the grotesque and comic aspects of the group to uncover
deeper themes of faith, selfhood, and transcendence. The project adds to our understanding of the
chinari and works to fill a gap in Slavic studies, as Druskin has received very little scholarly
attention in the field. This research also points to new directions for further study, prompting us
to examine more closely the influence of theology and European existentialism on the Soviet
literature of the absurd.

Keywords: Russian, absurdism, Russian literature, religion, metaphysics, Soviet, chinari,
Kharms, Druskin, Vvedensky

Powers,

3

Table of Contents
Abstract.......................................................................................................................................... 2
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... 4
A Note on Translation and Transliteration ................................................................................ 5
Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 6
Chapter 1: Yakov Druskin and The Divine Absurd ................................................................ 10
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 10
Faith and the Divine ................................................................................................................................ 11
The Basis of Faith ............................................................................................................................................... 11
The Nature of Faith ............................................................................................................................................. 13
Revelation: a certain equilibrium with a small error .......................................................................................... 15

Selfhood and Free Will ........................................................................................................................... 18
The Absurdity of Selfhood ................................................................................................................................. 19
Free Will as a Prison ........................................................................................................................................... 21
You and I ............................................................................................................................................................ 23

Time and Death ....................................................................................................................................... 25
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 28

Chapter 2: Searching for Faith in Kharms’ “The Old Woman” ........................................... 29
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 29
Time and Aging ...................................................................................................................................... 31
Faith and Free Will ................................................................................................................................. 37
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 46

Chapter 3: Equilibrium, Error, and Divinity in Vvedensky’s “God May be All Around” . 47
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 47
Reading Musically .................................................................................................................................. 50
Rhyme and Meter.................................................................................................................................... 57
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 61

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 63
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 65

Powers,

4

Acknowledgements
This project could only have come about with the help of a great many people. First, I
would like to thank my advisor, Professor Vladimir Vladimirovich Ivantsov, for believing in this
project and agreeing to advise it. I am also extremely grateful to Professors Tom Newlin and
Maia Vladimirovna Solovieva for their guidance, feedback, and support throughout my entire
Oberlin career. I also have Professor Tim Scholl to thank for first introducing me to the tradition
of the Soviet absurd. Moreover, I would like to thank the whole of the Russian department at
Oberlin College—faculty and students alike—for consistently believing in me, supporting me,
and helping me find such a fantastic academic home.
I would also like to thank all the friends who have helped carry me not only through this
research, but through the entirety of this extraordinarily trying year. I would like to specifically
thank Rob Klock for his camaraderie and help in preparing for my defense, Ben Scholl and
Henry Hicks for their invaluable, enduring friendship, and Catie Higgins, for everything.
Finally, I owe an endless debt of gratitude to my family. To my parents, Ann and Tom,
my brother, Zach, to Grandma, Pops, and Grammy. Without their love, care, generosity, and
support, none of this would be possible.

Powers,

5

A Note on Translation and Transliteration
Throughout this work, I have used the simplified ALA-LC transliteration system. Where
relevant, names have been transliterated as they most commonly are in translated works, even
when that transliteration deviates somewhat from the transliteration rules. For example, I use
Alexander Vvedensky rather than Aleksandr Vvedenskii, Yakov Druskin rather than Iakov
Druskin, and so forth. These transliterations come from the most recent major translators of
chinari works, Eugene Ostashevsky and Matvei Yankelevich.1
Unless otherwise indicated, all English translations of works cited in Russian are mine.

1

Eugene Ostashevsky, ed. OBERIU: An Anthology of Russian Absurdism (Evanston, Northwestern University Press,
2006).
Alexander Vvedensky, An Invitation for me to Think, ed. and trans. Eugene Ostashevsky and Matvei Yankelevich
(New York: New York Review Books, 2013).
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Introduction
In 2018, during my second year at Oberlin College, I was introduced to the chinari—a
literary and artistic collective formed in Leningrad at the dawn of the Soviet Union and the dusk
of Russian modernism.2 The two most well-known authors from the group, Daniil Kharms
(1905-1942) and Alexander Ivanovich Vvedensky (1904-1941), produced plays, poetry, and
prose which reveled in nonsense, grotesque humor, and literary distortions. For a brief period
from 1927 to 1931, the group existed as a formal collective called “OBERIU,” or “The
Association for Real Art.”3 Even after this formal group’s dissolution, the authors continued to
write to and with each other as chinari. For their gleeful rejection of order and
comprehensibility, their style has been termed “Russian absurdism.” As I read more of and about
the chinari, I quickly learned what scholars in the West have been discovering since Kharms and
Vvedensky first appeared in English in 19714—that the chinari have a literary depth far beyond
the grotesque slapstick one first encounters in their works. As I studied further, the most
enduring question I faced was that of religion. Kharms and Vvedensky mention God frequently,
and there are moments in their work when these references seem disarmingly sincere. However,
the opacity of their writings made it almost impossible to understand exactly what they thought
of Him or how religion and spirituality function in their artistic world. I became convinced that
there was some metaphysical, spiritual significance to the chinari project, but what was it? It was
in pursuit of an answer to this question that I came across Yakov Druskin.
2

The name chinari comes from the word chin, meaning “rank” as in Peter the Great’s table of ranks, used for
centuries in the Russian Empire to stratify the levels of government service. One member of the group is a chinar,
and the plural form is chinari.
3
Ob”edinenie real’nogo iskusstva
4
See George Gibian, ed., trans, Russia’s Lost Literature of the Absurd: Selected Works of Daniil Kharms and
Alexander Vvedensky (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1971).
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Yakov Semenovich Druskin’s (1902-1980) connection to the chinari goes all the way
back to his childhood, when he studied as a schoolchild in St. Petersburg (then Petrograd)
alongside Vvedensky and another future chinar, Leonid Savelevich Lipavsky (1904-1941).
Druskin remained close with the group throughout their lives and was a core member of their
intellectual circle. Unlike the other chinari, Druskin methodically avoided the limelight. He
didn’t publish anything until late in his life, and shunned both artistic and academic renown
despite having advanced training as a mathematician, philosopher, and pianist. Rather, Druskin
worked as a schoolteacher, writing prolifically in private.5
In most studies of the chinari, Druskin is primarily remembered not for his work, but for
outliving his friends and saving their manuscripts. By 1942, Kharms, Vvedensky, Lipavsky, and
Oleinikov had all suffered tragic and early deaths,6 leaving Druskin, rather suddenly, as the last
chinar. In the midst of the siege of Leningrad, Druskin saved a suitcase full of chinari
manuscripts from Kharms’ apartment, saving the group from historical extinction. Druskin wrote
often about his friends and their work, and in the last decade of his life he produced some of the
first scholarly analyses and histories of the group and their poetics.
In his own right, Druskin is a fascinating and eclectic thinker. He wrote on a wide range
of subjects from metaphysics to literary analysis to musicology both during and after the
lifetimes of the other chinari, and God remains a central theme throughout his oeuvre. His works
combine the convoluted style of the chinari with the metaphysical weight of existentialist

5

A. L. Dmitrenko and V. N. Sazhin, “Kratkaya istoriya ‘chinarei’” in “...Sborishche druzei, ostavlennykh
sud’boiu:” “Chinari” v tekstakh, dokumentakh, i issledovaniiakh v 2 tomakh, vol. 1, Ed. V. N. Sazhin, (Moscow:
Ladomir, 1998), 6. Throughout the rest of this thesis, this anthology will be cited as simply “Sborishche Druzei,”
following whichever particular author and essay is being cited.
6
Kharms and Vvedensky were both arrested in 1941 for political crimes and died within months of each other:
Vvedensky in December 1941 on a prison train from Kharkov to Kazan, Kharms in February 1942, in a prison
psychiatric ward. Lipavsky joined the war and was killed in battle outside Leningrad in 1941.
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philosophy, a deep-seeded spirituality, and the intimacy of a man writing—especially after
1942—to and for himself. Unfortunately, relatively little attention has been paid to Druskin’s
work itself, or its implications for our understanding of the chinari project more broadly.
Of course, there are some scholars who have dedicated serious energy to Druskin’s work,
and they bear mentioning here. Both Neil Carrick7 and Neil Cornwell8 mention the possibility of
Druskin’s philosophical work as a meaningful influence on Daniil Kharms, but neither pursue
this idea in depth. A number of Russian scholars—including Andrei Avdeenkov, Aleksei
Slobozhanin, and Kirill Drozdov, among others—have taken Druskin on his own terms,
recognizing his efforts to find and create deeper meaning within the chinari project and the
potential connections between Druskin and the broader category of existentialism.9 Druskin’s
writings on Johann Sebastian Bach—which will be discussed here further in chapters one and
three—have drawn the attention of some in the musicological community, including Marina
Lupishko. Lupishko’s paper on Druskin and Bach was of great use in researching this thesis and
represents, in my opinion, one of the finest English-language resources on Druskin available.10
Finally, in his fantastic book, Daniil Kharms and the End of the Russian Avant-Garde, JeanPhilippe Jaccard comes closest of all to my intentions with this thesis, connecting Druskin and
Kharms on a conceptual level and using Druskin’s philosophy to elucidate Kharms’ work.11

7

Neil Carrick, Daniil Kharms, Theologian of the Absurd (Birmingham: University of Birmingham Central Printing
Services, 1998), 71.
8
Neil Cornwell, “Introduction: Daniil Kharms, Black Miniaturist,” in Daniil Kharms and the Poetics of the Absurd:
Essays and Materials, ed. Neil Cornwell (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 3-22.
9
Andrei Nikolaevich Avdeenkov, “’Nekotoroe ravnovesie s nebol’shoi pogreshnost’iu:’ ekzistentsial’naia filosofiia
Ia. S. Druskina,” Vestnik Permskogo Universiteta 23, no. 3 (2015): 65-74.
Kirill Valer’evich Drozdov, “Lipavskii i Druskin: Chinari v poiskakh smysla,” Vestnik RGGU, Seriia:
Literaturovedenie. Iazykoznanie. Kul’turologiia, No. 10 (2007): 141-153.
Aleksei Viacheslavovich Slobozhanin “Gnoseologicheskie problemy v ekzistentsial'noi filosofii Ya.S. Druskina”
Gumanitarnye vedomosti TGPU im. L.N. Tolstogo, no. 4, (2015): 41-49.
10
Marina Lupishko, “In Search of Hieroglyphs: Iakov Druskin’s Back ‘Lexicon’ in the Aesthetic Context of the
Russian and Soviet Avant-garde,” The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 97, No. 4 (2019): 629-675.
11
Jean-Philippe Jaccard, Daniil Kharms i konets russkogo avangarda, trans. F. A. Perovskaya (St. Petersburg,
Gummanitarnoe agentstvo “Akademicheskii proekt,” 1995).
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Jaccard’s work in this area is discussed further in chapter two.
In the present project I hope to build upon the work of these scholars, further exploring
the power of Druskin to help us understand and interpret the chinari project. The thesis is
divided into three chapters: the first outlines some key elements of Druskin’s thought, while the
second two chapters apply these Druskinian concepts to the work of Kharms and Vvedensky
respectively. In the first chapter, I choose to incorporate works from across Druskin’s life,
including those written long after the death of Kharms and Vvedensky. This reflects my belief
that it is not only Druskin’s direct influence on his friends during their lifetime which holds
value. I suggest that we should also see value in using Druskin’s thought—in all its stages of
development—as a lens through which to read the metaphysical and spiritual aspects of the
chinari. In the second two chapters, I choose depth over breadth, focusing on just one piece by
each of the two authors. Across the work, I argue that Druskin’s philosophy helps us connect
absurdity and divinity in new ways, revealing a chinari metaphysics concerned not only with
destroying rationality, but with transcending it, searching beyond for something sacred and
divine.

9
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Chapter 1: Yakov Druskin and The Divine Absurd
Introduction
This chapter aims to construct a brief overview of some key elements in Druskin’s
philosophical thought, which will be further developed and connected to individual chinari
works in the following chapters. Druskin’s long and prolific life leaves the modern student with a
vast, relatively unstructured body of work, which cannot be comprehensively reviewed in the
space available here. As such, I have had to be selective in which concepts I choose to cover, and
which of Druskin’s work I choose to cite. The chapter is not chronological, nor is it
comprehensive. Rather, the chapter has been broken into three sections, each corresponding to
Druskin’s treatment of themes which are also highly visible in Kharms and Vvedensky. First, we
dive into Druskin’s writings on faith itself, to glean more about what he actually thought about
faith, beyond the mere fact that he was religious. In doing so, we set the stage for fruitful
interpretations of the myriad mentions of God in other chinari works. Second, the chapter
reviews Druskin’s thinking on selfhood and free will. This is not only an area of common
interest between Druskin and his peers, but it is where Druskin makes some of his most unique
contributions to existential philosophy writ large. Finally, the chapter ends with a brief overview
of Druskin’s views on time, specifically as they relate to transcendence and divinity. Throughout
the chapter, I attempt to show that these themes are united by the overarching idea that in order
to return to God, humans must transcend all facets of rationality, which are ultimately only
barriers between us and divine absurdity.
Throughout this chapter, and throughout the work as a whole, I describe things as
“absurd” and refer to “the absurd” as a generic category. While a comprehensive discussion of
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what exactly constitutes absurdism in literature is beyond the scope of this project, it is worth
giving some explanation of that to which I am referring. I see two meanings of “absurdity”
within the texts analyzed in this project. The first pertains to events which are utterly nonsensical
or illogical and contrary to sense or reason, often to a laughable, comic extent. While we will
certainly encounter and contend with this absurdity throughout this and the following chapters,
we must also understand absurdity from a more philosophical perspective. Existentially, the
absurd carries significance beyond humor and sense-destructing play. Ultimately, the whole
realm of things which lay outside of human understanding—as above, “utterly nonsensical or
illogical” —qualifies as absurd. Anything is absurd that is contrary to “normal” human
understanding, or, even more simply, beyond humanity. In this light, we can describe the
mystery of God, too, as absurd. Absurdity is mysterious, pervasive, and—as we will see—
intertwined with divinity.

Faith and the Divine
The Basis of Faith
Throughout Druskin’s literary career, across disciplines and decades, God, faith, and the
concept of divinity play a central role. While God and spirituality are too intertwined and
fundamental to Druskin’s thinking to be fully understood in isolation from his other works, direct
treatment of the topic is essential for any understanding of Druskin and his influence on the other
chinari. That Yakov Druskin’s thought would be so intensely centered around Christian theology
was never a given. Druskin, like Kharms and other chinari, was Jewish, although not brought up
in strict practice of the faith. Druskin came to faith as an adult, through the music of Bach, after a
1928 performance of the St. Matthew Passion triggered within him a profound religious and
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spiritual awakening.12 This awakening seems to have propelled Druskin’s writing—his first
diaries date back to that same year, 1928. Thus, we can come to two preliminary conclusions
which we ought to keep in mind while reading and thinking about Druskin. First, the origins of
Druskin’s faith lie in the creative arts, particularly music. Second, faith is more than just a theme
in his writing. Rather, it is one of the key motivating factors that drove him to write in the first
place. This is especially relevant, given the lack of monetary or professional incentive for
Druskin to write or publish anything officially.13
Druskin’s religiosity, along with his philosophy as a whole, is deeply personal—he often
states that his judgements “are applicable only to himself.”14 Although it takes an unmistakably
Christian form, his religious thinking is much more concerned with a mystical—and, as I argue,
absurdist—type of personal faith than with ethical debates, normative teachings, or any
association with organized religion and church institutions. This lack of institutional affiliation is
due, in part, to the political climate in which Druskin lived. To be a Christian philosopher in the
early Soviet Union was, after all, no simple task. However, this position was not purely one of
forced circumstance, but of conscious choice. In his diaries, Druskin claims that his decision to
forego formal baptism came from a fear of losing the “purity” of his faith.15 Here already we are
faced with a contradiction: if Druskin considers baptism, which would normally be considered
the ultimate confirmation of faith, to be a potentially dangerous distraction from faith’s purity,
what exactly does faith mean to him?

12

Lupishko, “In Search of Hieroglyphs,” 630.
Avdeenkov, “Nekotoroe revnovesie s nebol’shoi pogreshnost’iu,” 73.
14
Mikhail Epstein, “Yakov Druskin, 1902-1980” in Filosofia, An Encyclopedia of Russian Thought, 2018,
http://filosofia.dickinson.edu/encyclopedia/druskin-yakov/.
15
Yakov Semenovich Druskin, Dnevniki, (St. Petersburg: Gummanitarnoe agentstvo “Akademicheskiy proekt,”
1999), 126-127.
13
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The Nature of Faith
Perhaps the most fascinating and revelatory insights into Druskin’s actual, procedural
understanding of faith comes to us from the aptly titled essay “On Faith” (O vere).16 Right away,
Druskin makes clear his position that God cannot be comprehended logically, and that we must
reach for something far beyond human reason in order to find faith. He writes,
God is not in knowledge and certainty, but rather in ignorance, uncertainty, and faith.
Kierkegaard: Paganism is belief in the believable. Christianity is belief in the
unbelievable… nothing justifies faith. Faith itself justifies. But even this can turn into
temptation: Only God justifies.17
This insistence on the incomprehensible nature of God and faith is at the core of Druskin’s belief
system, which, in turn, is at the core of his other thought. To believe is, itself, an absurd act.
Moreover, any move to rationalize or justify faith renders faith itself impossible. Here, it is
worthwhile to briefly note the influence on Druskin of the Danish philosopher Soren
Kierkegaard. Druskin references Kierkegaard a number of times throughout his works and
diaries, and there is definite room for parallels to be drawn between Druskin and Kierkegaard in
terms of faith and its connection with the absurd or transrational. While a full exploration of
Druskin and his connection to Kierkegaard and European existentialism is promising, it is far
beyond the scope of this study. For now, the most important thing Druskin’s reference to
Kierkegaard tells us is that his thoughts did not develop in a vacuum, and that he had at least
some access to such philosophy.
Towards the end of “On Faith,” Druskin goes on to describe the process of attaining allconsuming faith as “opening your eyes”—a process which is at once extremely easy, since the

16

The exact date of this essay is unknown, but it appears in conjunction with another essay, “On Will” (o vole),
which dates from 1956. The style and content of “On Faith” support the hypothesis that it was written around that
same time.
17
Yakov Semenovich Druskin, Vblizi Vestnikov, (Washington: Frager, 1998), 87.
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only thing stopping one from doing it is one’s self, and extremely difficult, since to
independently overcome the self is impossible. Druskin dwells in this contradiction, describing
how impossible this task is, and yet how it may be done anyway through God. When Druskin
does “open [his] eyes,” he finds himself in blissful harmony with both the physical and
metaphysical worlds.18 For Druskin, it is not only God that cannot be understood directly through
human calculation, but faith as well:
It is hard to say what faith is… once, in times of temptation and despair (iskusheniia i
unyniia), I wrote: ‘strictly speaking, I cannot say that I believe. I don’t disbelieve.’ By
intuitive logic it follows, then, that I believe… If there is not indifference or bitterness
towards faith, then ‘I don’t disbelieve,’ but if there exists an endless interest in God, then
this is already the desire for faith; that is, faith.19
It seems here that all things divine and metaphysical are at once vitally important and impossible
to define, existing as moving targets, impossible to pin down. Druskin implies that the only thing
really necessary for belief is the desire to believe. This position is important to keep in mind, as
it is reflected in Kharms’ “The Old Woman.”
In a short tract from 1930 titled “On a nonbelieving person” (o neveruiushchem
cheloveke), a younger Druskin develops similar lines of thought on the nature of faith to those
we have seen in “On Faith.” Druskin claims that he “must write a study on a nonbelieving
person. But a nonbelieving person does not exist. Thus, I wanted to write a study of a person
who became a nonbeliever.” Druskin describes four different hypothetical people, each with their
own reason for becoming nonbelievers. The first becomes a nonbeliever “by relying on his own
mind,” the second because “his feelings were divided.” Druskin describes his third person as an
“unlucky creation of God'' who is crushed and becomes a nonbeliever because he is left with “no

18
19

Druskin, Vblizi Vestnikov, 92.
Druskin, 88.

Powers, 15
opinions or judgement.” Finally, the fourth person becomes a nonbeliever through his love of
“decorations” (ukrasheniia). Each person proclaims, “there is no God,” and promptly ceases to
exist. Druskin then turns on himself, claiming that he has made a mistake: the second person, he
claims, didn’t actually become a nonbeliever, because he still had “feeling” (chuvstvo). The
fourth person also didn’t stop believing, he just “had good taste,” and the third still had desire,
which, as we have already discovered, is synonymous with faith for Druskin. Only the first
person, who came to nonbelief through his own mind and reason, can really be called a
nonbeliever. Druskin concludes that the mind is the only reason for nonbelief, and that while the
human mind can seem at first like a gift, like something that gives, it turns out to be an ultimately
self-destructive force that gives nothing.20
The mind, as it stands for reason and rationality, is a dangerous and destructive object for
Druskin. It is a cage, a barrier, and in fact the only thing standing between us and faith. In light
of this understanding, absurdity as the path to faith makes perfect sense. If rational sense is the
only thing standing in our way, it must be transcended. This act of transcendence, by its very
definition, flies in the face of all that is rational; all that our mind can comprehend. To have faith,
then, is a fundamentally absurd act.

Revelation: a certain equilibrium with a small error
While faith and God will feature heavily beyond this section, there is one more important
aspect of Druskin’s religious thinking to cover here: the moment of revelation. For Druskin,
divine revelation takes place in the moment at the intersection of opposing concepts, or in the
small error that destabilizes an otherwise unified system. Here, we turn to one of our key

20

Druskin, “O neveruiushchem cheloveke” in “Sborishche druzei,” 735.
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Druskinian concepts, “a certain equilibrium with a small error” (nekotoroe ravnovesie s
nebol’shoi pogreshnost’iu). The concept, as a motif appearing throughout Druskin’s oeuvre, is
difficult to pin down. The idea appears in Druskin’s diaries as early as 1933, in the context of
finding one’s place in space and time. In the relevant passage, he writes,
In the certain equilibrium of the order of events which pertain to me, there is also a small
error. When I drop a habit, for example, there is a duration of time for which I feel a large
deficiency. But since a new equilibrium, not deferring from the first, is eventually
reestablished, it follows to think of this gap as a small error.21
Fleeting as the mention of equilibrium and error may have been in 1933, the idea stuck with
Druskin, and he returned to it with more attention later in his life. By the 1960s, Druskin seems
to have realized a much deeper significance to the concept, prompting him to write, in 1966,
…I found a certain error in the order of events which pertain to me. This error is the
beginning of all philosophizing, the catalyst of all of human action and life. It is this
error, and not ambition, which drives creativity: the desire to define one’s place in life…
not empirically, but transcendentally.22
This connection between the “small error” as a feature of time as experienced by humans with its
greater importance for human life and creativity allows for the concept’s meaning and
applicability to expand. In art, as in life, equilibrium may be boring in its perfection, leading to
stagnation. It is only in a moment of imperfection that we are driven to be more conscious, more
thoughtful; more active and creative. Here we already see something sacred about the small
error. The small rift in the fabric of ordered equilibrium, in effect, opens the door to
transcendence.
The implications of “a certain equilibrium with a small error” on creativity and the arts is
not merely abstract for Druskin. In his musicological book, On Rhetorical Principles in the

21
22

Druskin, Dnevniki, 52.
Druskin, 498.
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Music of J. S. Bach, Druskin brings the concept to bear on Bach’s music.
In Bach there is rarely full symmetry in the construction of themes, even under zero
amplitude. More often, he deviates from it. This, too, is a certain allegory. Perfect
equilibrium is maintained, despite the small error in it. Not only in Bach’s themes, but in
his work as a whole … One feels an allegorical equilibrium in the structure of the
whole—a certain equilibrium with a small error.23
A small error within equilibrium—that is the spiritual revelation Druskin found in Bach. For
Druskin, the “small error” is sacred. Not only is it, as Jean-Phillipe Jaccard writes, that which
“makes the world exist, or better that which makes it real for us,”24 but it is that which allows us
to access the equilibrium in the first place. “A certain equilibrium” is divine, and thus
inaccessible, impossible to understand in its pure form via human reason. However, in the
moment of its violation—in the form of a small error—humans can gain knowledge of that
certain equilibrium. That is, humans can achieve revelation. At the highest level, we can step
back and imagine God’s spirit as the ultimate ravnovesie: perfect, divine, and incomprehensible.
In order to reveal himself to the masses, God had to send His son, who is fundamentally removed
from the Holy Spirit, made imperfect through his mortality. In Jesus, God created a dent, a crease
in the flat plane of His divinity—that is, a small error. With this in mind, the revelatory power of
a “small error” can be traced back to the fact that the term is an allusion to Jesus Christ himself.
Thus, Bach’s subtle violations of his own order are not just beautiful, but divine, recreating in
miniature the process of divine revelation through Jesus Christ.25

23

Yakov Semenovich Druskin, O ritoricheskikh priemakh v muzyke I. S. Bakha (St. Petersburg, Severnyi Olen’
1995), 125.
24
Jaccard, 142.
25
Interestingly, Kharms takes up a similar idea in his expansions on another Druskinian concept, “this and that” (eto
i to). Kharms posits that in between “this” and “that,” there exists a third thing, which he calls an “obstacle”
(prepiatstvie). Kharms goes on to draw this graphically, showing a horizontal line labeled “this” on the left and
“that” on the right, intersected by a vertical line П representing the “obstacle.” He then shows how this diagram
transposes into a cross, implying that this dynamic carries the same symbolic weight as the cross, which for Kharms
is the “symbolic sign of the law of existence and life.” (Jaccard, 138-139).
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Faith requires that we access a divine equilibrium that is, by definition, inaccessible to us.
That is, it demands the absolute absurd of the human mind, which yearns for reason. It is only
with the help of a wrinkle in this unvarnished unity—a small error—that we can achieve
revelation. Druskin finds this revelatory quality—a certain equilibrium with a small error— in
literature as well as in music. As chapter three shows, further exploration of this concept is
immensely helpful as we try to understand metaphysical significance in the structure of chinari
texts.

Selfhood and Free Will
In Druskin’s exploration of religion, as we have seen, he quickly turns to faith and the
means of achieving it. As such, it follows naturally that his interest in the relationship between
the self and God should lead to an interest in the nature of selfhood. In a broad sense, almost all
of Druskin’s work has some relation to “the self,” as he mostly writes in the first person. In the
absence of a publisher—and without an audience after the death of the other chinari—his work
is also directed largely at the self, written often in a private, almost intimate register. As such,
there are many interpretations one could make, and many aspects of “selfhood” that could be
fruitfully examined. However, for our purposes, the most important writings on selfhood and free
will come from the book, The Vision of Blindness (Videnie nevideniia) (1995),26 as well as from
the essay “You and I: Noumenal relationship” (Ia i ty, noumenal’noe otnoshenie) (1964). In
these pieces, Druskin distills and systematizes ideas which appear as themes throughout his
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earlier work as well as in the works of the other chinari, including the fundamental absurdity of
selfhood, the constraining energy of free will, and the ultimate necessity to renounce the rational
mind.

The Absurdity of Selfhood
In the beginning of The Vision of Blindness, Druskin describes the simple but profound
phenomenon of catching a glimpse of himself in the mirror and becoming frightened, and it is
from this feeling of surprised fright that he launches into the rest of the book. From this
estranging moment of self-perception, Druskin immediately spins out a stream-of-consciousness
analysis in nine points, identifying a multitude of selves that become real through their
perception, objectification, and alienation. This attempt at self-knowledge results in a deep
despair—Druskin writes,
I ask, ‘who am I?’ and already the answer ‘I am I myself’ is self-objectifying. In my
reflection and self-objectification, I do not find myself: I stray ever further from myself,
until I lose myself in the abomination of desolation (merzost’ zapusteniia) in the fires of
hell.27
Here, we see the central absurdity of selfhood for Druskin: that any attempt at self-location or
self-perception triggers an infinite feedback loop that accomplishes the exact opposite of its goal,
serving only to further alienate you from yourself. However, this is only one side of the absurdity
of selfhood. While it manifests itself in lived experience as a downwards spiral of selfobjectification and alienization, Druskin finds a more theoretical side of the same phenomenon
through the following train of thought: God creates humans in his image, but He also bestows
them with limited knowledge and powers. In doing so, according to Druskin, He bestows upon
humankind an “endless responsibility.” This “responsibility,” as Druskin describes it, is to “open
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my eyes … and become blessed, as He is blessed.” Here, Druskin’s imagery of “opening the
eyes” reminds us that this is the same revelation described in the previously discussed essay, “On
Faith: “Then my eyes open, and in every stone, in every tree stump, I see the earth and the
heavens, the whole world, and every hardship and every misery becomes not a hardship and not
a misery, but a blessing.”28 Moreover, it leads Druskin to what he calls his “existential
contradiction: I cannot take this endless responsibility upon myself, as it is beyond my strength; I
can’t not accept this endless responsibility upon myself, as He has already bestowed it upon
me.”29 Despite being guiltless and perfect in the moment of creation, humans are simultaneously
unable to carry out their primary responsibility to God, and are instantly rendered guilty,
imperfect. In fact, Druskin goes so far as to call this inability to comprehend and carry out this
responsibility his “original sin.”30
In this analysis of sin and the self, we have an application of Druskin’s term, “A certain
equilibrium with a small error.” Here, the “certain unity” is God’s image, in which we are
created. However, within that harmonious equilibrium, there is a small error: the fundamental sin
which comes from a human’s inability to comprehend and carry out our responsibility to God.
Druskin makes this idea explicit in his later essay, “You and I, Noumenal Relationship:” “Only
[man] is created directly in God’s image and likeness. But in sin, man violates this likeness: he
becomes a self. ‘Selfness’ separates man from God.”31 Andrei Nikolayevich Avdeenkov reaches
a similar conclusion: “To understand [the equilibrium of the universe], one must venture beyond
the bounds of stable equilibrium, introducing into it an element of error, inaccuracy. Humankind
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violates natural equilibrium through its existence.”32 That is to say, sin is the only thing
separating us from God, and all of selfhood—everything we can hope to know and experience
through our senses and reason—exists within that “small error.” Avdeenkov’s conclusion also
points us towards the broader allegorical significance of the term outlined earlier: if the human
condition is necessarily a violation of “natural equilibrium,” Jesus’ humanity makes sense as a
“small error” within the natural equilibrium of the Holy Spirit.
Druskin sees selfhood and godliness as being at odds with each other, yet another
indication of the absurdity of selfhood. “The contradiction of man is that he himself sets himself
apart from God, and at the same time he himself must renounce himself in order to return to
God.”33 The self is not an ideal, but rather a barrier, separating us from the divine. The answer,
then, is to return to God, to overcome the rational mind, to embrace and embody the absurd. This
is no simple task, but Druskin nonetheless offers a path forward. In this path to selftranscendence, Druskin adds an important additional layer: that of free will.

Free Will as a Prison
Singling out free will in Druskin’s work is important not only because he has interesting
things to say on the subject (although this is very much the case), but also because the issue is
very relevant to the other authors whose works we will examine. In many of the works of
Kharms and Vvedensky, free will is convoluted, if not denied altogether. Characters make
strange choices, things appear to happen for no apparent reason, and the general link between
choice and consequence is distorted. Here, again, Druskin provides a useful contextual
underpinning for our understanding of the chinari.
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Essentially, Druskin sees “free will” as a deception on two fronts. First, in the fact of free
choice itself, Druskin sees a negative side: If our lives are subject to our choice at every given
moment, then we are forced to choose in every moment. Even the lack of choice is, in fact, a
choice (the choice to do nothing), and in this sense we are imprisoned, rather than being free. We
are obligated to constantly choose one of an infinite number of possibilities, and are thus limiting
ourselves, closing doors. As Mikhail Epstein writes in his analysis of Druskin’s philosophy,
“freedom, in practice, becomes a chain of necessary limitations.”34 Both Epstein and Avdeenkov,
writing on Druskin’s views on free will, note the comparison here to Jean-Paul Sartre, who
expresses a similar sentiment in “Existentialism is a Humanism” (1946): “In one sense, choice is
possible; what is impossible is not to choose. I can always choose, but I must also realize that, if
I decide not to choose, that still constitutes a choice.”35 This similarity, however, exists only on
the surface. Although the idea of being “condemned to choose” appears similarly in both
Druskin and Sartre, we must remember that Sartre and Druskin come from starkly different sides
of the existential debate. Sartre’s statement comes from the viewpoint of atheistic existentialism.
He stresses the impact and importance of individual choice, and his ultimate conclusion is closer
to the cliche “life is what you make it” than anything else. Druskin, on the other hand, is
operating from a firmly religious standpoint, and his conclusions are rather different. Druskin
overlaps with Sartre in the method he uses to undermine “freedom” in free choice, but Druskin
goes further. For Druskin, free will carries actively negative connotations.
In order to understand this, we must remember the role that the rational mind plays in
Druskin’s thinking. As was made clear in the discussion on the nature of faith, the rational mind
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is the ultimate barrier between us and divinity. From these two foundational beliefs—that
divinity exists and is worth striving towards, and that the rational mind is the main thing holding
us back—Druskin’s rejection of free will becomes clear: Free will is the self at work, and the self
is, in a word, self-interested. It can only act within its limited abilities and cannot transcend itself.
Druskin describes this as humankind’s “natural attitude” (estestvennaia ustanovka).36
Humankind, in its natural attitude, has a subversive motive: “Man, by his very nature—
consciously or unconsciously—strives to replace God with himself, to take His place, make
himself God.”37 Thus, “free will” is really a prison, another barrier to revelation, another human
facet which ends up being primarily a limitation; something to overcome.

You and I
Having seen selfhood in all of its absurdity, and having exposed the sinister nature of free
will, what is to be done? Druskin seems to have given the human soul a great deal to
“transcend.” How can it be done? While the chinari seem generally unconcerned with answers,
preferring to complicate, contradict, and bewilder, Druskin actually attempts to answer the
question in “You and I: Noumenal Relationship.” His answer is relatively simple, and
surprisingly sweet: We need a companion.
More precisely, the I needs to be in a “noumenal relationship”38 with a you. For Druskin,
the vast majority of love, even the strongest sort, is “natural” rather than noumenal.39 Since it
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ultimately relates back to the self, this love and these relationships boil down to egoism. Druskin
uses a mother and her child as an example: “The love of a mother to her child, especially an
infant, is natural, tribal egoism…because an infant child is not yet an I, and for the mother is not
yet a you either, but rather her own natural continuation. However, if the mother sees in her child
a future you, created in the image and likeness of God, then her love is noumenal, and not just
natural.” To be noumenal, then, for Druskin, is to be in reference not to the self, but to God.
Thus, “the relationship between you and I is noumenal if between you and I there stands God.”40
This you, the special other with whom you have a noumenal bond, Druskin calls a “coresponsible assistant” (sootvetstvenniy pomoshchnik).41 When a person achieves this sort of
relationship, they become able to overcome the abject spiral involved in trying to independently
locate and understand the self. Through each other and the relationship between them, their
burden—their endless responsibility—becomes shared, and lightened. Through noumenal
companionship, we touch God.
However, Druskin ends his essay with a caveat: There is a second path to God, without a
companion. It is also possible, despite its difficulty, to have a noumenal relationship with
oneself.
By refusing a sentimental or prideful relationship with myself—that is, by humbling
myself—I find a new order for my life in the past, I find a kind of unnatural permanence
within the natural state of change. I truly feel a kind of common leadership in my life,
despite the vast number of mistakes for which I now so deeply repent… This is the path
of penance, humility, and prayer.42
If coming to God through a companion involves overcoming the self through effectively melding
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identities with someone else, this path involves a more intense self-denial which, in turn, gets
more directly at God.
Thus, we have the broad strokes of the self and free will according to Druskin: The
absurdity of selfhood, free will as a prison, and a path forward through noumenal companionship
or mystical self-transcendence. However, this is not the end of what we can say about Druskin.
In “On Faith,” Druskin writes, “God is now—the eternal now.” This cryptic statement points us
to the final major theme we must cover before we understand the concepts which we are to see in
Kharms and Vvedensky: Time.

Time and Death
Even early in his life, Druskin had already identified the core elements of his views on
time. In a fragment dated to the second half of the 1920s, he lays out a “new theory of time,”
which, as he claims, had been revealed to him by God. The theory, in its entirety, is as follows:
“When something was, then it was not, just like that which will be, but it is now. And the
reverse: when something is now, that which was before was not before, just like that which will
be later.”43
Straight away, we run into the aforementioned interpretative challenge: while Druskin
was attempting to systematize chinari thought, he was a chinari himself, and utilized many of
the same stylistic conventions as his friends—that is to say, he often wrote in the most
convoluted way imaginable. Nonetheless, the thrust of the theory can be clarified: The past,
present, and future cannot be considered separately from one another. Each has an impact on the
others, and all three are somehow bound together in a mysterious, overarching unity.
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Additionally, the connection between time and God was already firmly established, as was
Druskin’s insistence on the limits of his own knowledge. He stresses, before delivering the
“theory,” that he himself didn’t know what he was saying, and that he was only repeating what
God had given him. Thus, we can already say that much like the self and divinity, time is another
concept that exists beyond the powers of the rational mind.
As the chinari pushed forth into the 1930s, past the end of the OBERIU era, Druskin’s
father suddenly died. This propelled him into a deep, prolonged personal crisis, and produced a
beautiful, haunting essay entitled “Death.”44 While, as I have already stated, all of Druskin’s
writing is strikingly personal, this is especially true of “Death.” In it, Druskin is wrestling
directly with his father’s passing—the first of many deaths with which he would be forced to
reckon—and in doing so, he lays out an evolved conception of time that would persevere long
after the passing of his father. Druskin begins the discussion of time with a starkly pessimistic
observation: “The whole is not comprehensible within time. Time bears death.” Time, as a
directional force, has a destination, which for Druskin is death and decay. He sees this as, in fact,
the only function of time, separating “time” as a directional process from “moments.” He writes:
One can say what is not in time, but how can one say what time is? Not any of the words
that apply to things that exist can be applied to time; we may even say that it does not
exist. But this nonexistent thing is the most frightening of powers and you feel best when
you don’t feel it. Nor do I understand when they say that something exists in time.
Something exists in the moment, whereas in time it is destroyed and ceases to exist.45
With the death of his father, Druskin feels the weight of time squarely upon his
shoulders, and the existential dread that comes with the promise of aging and eventual death. But
this is not simply Druskin wallowing in his sadness. He means what he says here, and he comes
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to important conclusions. First, a conclusion about the moment: “The moment is the only reality.
Then there are also memory, imagination, and reason. All of them can be united under the name
of ideas. They are the signs of moments. They put a stop to duration, they divide it. When I find
the right sign, I name the moment, and motion and duration halt, they cease to exist, they become
what they are, that is: nothing. For they do not exist in the moment, and nothing exists apart from
the moment.” Second, a conclusion about God: “If God sees my whole life, he sees it at once,
that is to say not in time. God does not see time, whereas I experience time as a certain defect ... I
do apprehend myself, but only in the moment.”46 From these quotes, we see the “moment” as
both more real and more important than linear time whereas God exists beyond time, in what
could be described as a never-ending moment, an eternal now.
This connection between the end of time and transcendence is a theme in the chinari’s
creative oeuvre. The connection between Druskin and Vvedensky will be discussed in greater
depth in chapter three, but we can already see how Druskin’s philosophy helps bring meaning to
the final lines of Vvedensky’s “God May be All Around” (Krugom vozmozhno Bog), which
initially seem like absurdist nonsense: “In runs a dead man / and silently erases time.”47 If we
understand time in Druskin’s terms—that is, as a defect, a harbinger of death, a reflection of
humankind’s limited ability to comprehend the true nature of things—we can then understand
the erasure or destruction of time as a transcendent act. This adds metaphysical weight to the
passage and works against the tendency to interpret absurdism as a postmodern process by which
meaning is simply contorted to the point of nonexistence.
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Conclusion
In the course of this chapter, we have seen how Druskin relates the self, free will, and
linear time to each other as obstacles; agents of the rational mind which must be overcome in
order to find God. We have seen the metaphysical importance of absurdity for Druskin, as
overcoming rationality and embracing the absurd is the only way to access the divine. Divinity is
absurd, and absurdity is divine: the two define each other. In the next chapter, we will see how
Druskin’s work on faith and free will helps uncover deeper meanings in the prose of Daniil
Kharms.
We have also discovered the role of creative art in the process of revelation. Beyond the
fact that Druskin’s religious revelation is rooted in the aesthetic experience of Bach’s music, the
concept of “a certain equilibrium with a small error” helps us see religious allegory in artistic
asymmetry. While Druskin found this asymmetry in Bach, we know that he saw the same
significance in the works of the other chinari. In chapter three, “a certain equilibrium with a
small error” will become an invaluable tool to help us understand how the structure of a work of
art—not just its content or context—can perform a divine task.
Thus, understanding Druskin’s key concepts reveals a new depth of metaphysical
sincerity and nuance to the greater chinari project, shedding a new light on particular aspects of
the poetics of the group’s central figures: Kharms and Vvedensky.
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Chapter 2: Searching for Faith in Kharms’ “The Old Woman”
Introduction
Daniil Ivanovich Kharms, born as Daniil Ivanovich Yuvachev in Saint Petersburg in 1905, has
become the best-known of the chinari by a wide margin. Scholarship around Kharms is much
more robust than around any other chinar or around the group in general, but surprisingly little
attention has been given to the relationship between him and Druskin. One scholar who has
recognized Druskin’s importance to understanding Kharms is Jean-Philippe Jaccard. In his book,
Daniil Kharms and the End of the Russian Avant-Garde,48 Jaccard focuses his study primarily on
Druskin’s writings from the late 1920s and early 1930s—the period of the OBERIU in which he
had the most “intense relationship”49 with Kharms. Jaccard succeeds in establishing the direct
influence of Druskin on Kharms, particularly through his exploration of “this and that” (eto i
to)—a recurring motif in the work of Druskin and Lipavsky seen in their writings as early as the
1920s—and its connection with Kharms’ 1930 poem “Notnow” (neteper’).50
In this chapter I have taken a different—and necessarily narrower—approach,
incorporating some of the later philosophical works discussed in chapter one and using Druskin’s
thought as a prism through which to view just one of Kharms’ stories, “The Old Woman”
(Starukha). Written in 1939, “The Old Woman” is among Kharms’ latest, longest, and most
well-known pieces. The story follows a writer who meets an old woman one day by chance. The
woman appears in his apartment later on and seems to wield a dominant power over the narrator
before suddenly dropping dead. The narrator intends to get rid of the body immediately, but ends
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up meeting his friend, Sakerdon Mikhailovich, and an unnamed woman. He talks with them both
about God and other existential matters before finally boarding a train bound for Lisy Nos with
the old woman’s corpse stuffed in a suitcase. On the train, however, the suitcase vanishes. The
story ends with a fascinating, nebulous final scene: the narrator arrives at Lisy Nos, walks into
the woods, and says a prayer: “In the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, now
and forever and ever, amen.”51 Unlike many of the short poems and prose fragments from earlier
works, “The Old Woman” has a definite plot and a comprehensible (although still bizarre)
structure. It also has a notable philosophical and metaphysical weight. The characters deal
directly, albeit strangely, with the question of God, making “The Old Woman” an excellent
example for analysis here.
While my analysis of “The Old Woman” is aimed at metaphysical questions and the
connections between Kharms and Druskin, I must briefly address the socio-political context in
which the story came to be. As scholars routinely point out, the often-cruel absurdity of Kharms’
work can be seen, in part, as a reflection of the era of Stalinist repression through which he lived.
While I believe that we must be careful not to rely too heavily on this comparison to explain
away all of Kharms’ artistic intentions, it is certainly important to keep in mind. In fact, I see it
as especially relevant for this story. By the time it was written, this political system had begun to
have real consequences for Kharms and people around him. Kharms himself had not yet suffered
greatly, although he was blacklisted briefly in 1937 after political allegory was found in one of
his children’s poems. However, some more peripheral members of the literary circle were not so
lucky. Nikolai Zabolotsky, despite having estranged himself from the chinari in favor of writing
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government-approved verse, was accused of affiliation with a “group of terrorist writers” and
sent to a labor camp that same year, 1937. Most brutally, the year before, Nikolai Oleinikov was
executed after being forced to admit to participation in a Trotskyist plot.52 By late 1938 and early
1939, social and political issues were coming to a dangerous and chaotic boil, both in broader
Europe and among the Russian literary avant-garde.53
While socio-political interpretations of this text are certainly valuable, my aim here, is
not to focus on the political context of “The Old Woman,” but to use it as a case study, to
demonstrate how the philosophical ideas of Yakov Druskin can give rise to new readings and
interpretations of Kharms’ work. In this chapter, I will present two insights into the “The Old
Woman,” both of which become possible by reading Kharms through a Druskinian lens. First, I
will examine the central role time plays within the story, using Druskin’s writings on time to
propose that anxieties around aging are a central part of the narrator’s struggle. Second, I will
turn to the question of faith in the story, engaging with two earlier analyses to present a new
interpretation of the story as a parable of the narrator’s coming to faith, grounded in Druskin’s
writings on faith and free will.

Time and Aging
The first insight into “The Old Woman” that Druskin helps uncover is centered around
time. Time is clearly a major theme in the story, but its significance is hard to tease out. Using
Druskin’s 1935 essay, “Death” as a lens, I argue that the old woman can be seen to act as a
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personification of time itself, against which the narrator wrestles as he struggles with aging and
bodily decay.
From the very beginning of the story, the narrator is set at odds with time. He approaches
an old woman holding a clock on the street to ask for the time54 and is surprised when the
woman’s clock has no hands. Somehow, however, the woman is still able to tell the narrator
what time it is. This immediate plunge into the situationally absurd can be seen from a formalist
perspective as a device to destabilize all forms of order in the story, but it lays the metaphysical
framework for the story as well. If we remember the significance for Druskin of transcending
linear time, the clock with no hands can be taken as a symbolic hint at the strange, divine nature
of things to come. Of course, the narrator is bound to the imperfect, human understanding of
sequential time, and is forced to ask the old woman to tell him the time in the conventional sense.
Nonetheless, he feels a vague sense of the underlying truth of the handless clock: “I keep
remembering the old woman with the clock whom I saw today in the yard, and it seems pleasant
to me that her clock had no hands. Recently in a secondhand shop I saw a repulsive kitchen clock
on which the hands were made to look like a knife and fork.”55 The contrast between the old
woman’s handless clock and the kitschy kitchen clock reflects Druskinian conceptions of time.
Something about the handless clock feels correct, pure, “pleasant,” while the hands of a clock
can be seen as dissecting tools, cutting a whole into strange chunks that are simultaneously
artificial as well as completely necessary in order for us to make even an attempt at self-location.
In addition, this quote helps illustrate the double-sided nature of the chinari absurd: the mundane
and the metaphysical. The clock from the secondhand shop is comic, tacky, and vulgar. The old
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woman’s clock, while equally absurd, has a spiritual weight to it that becomes visible through
the prism of Druskin.
As the story goes on, the narrator’s relationship with time is strained, impatient, and
uncomfortable. In multiple instances, he sets out to do something for a certain amount of time
but ends up spending far too much or too little time on each task. He tries to take a long nap but
can’t sleep. He wants to write for 18 hours straight but can’t get past a single sentence. When he
wants something to take a long time, he can’t make it happen. Conversely, when he wants to
hurry, he wastes time: “Quickly, quickly to work. Away with all dreams and laziness…. It’s only
five o’clock. I have all day before me, the evening and the whole night… I stand in the middle of
the room. What am I thinking about? It’s already twenty to six. I’ve got to write.”56 More
broadly, the narrator runs into a litany of time-based problems throughout the story: The bread
line is too long, the old woman is decomposing because the narrator took too long to get home,
the house superintendent won’t be in until the following day—just to name a few examples.
These temporal obstacles and anxieties pervade “The Old Woman.” But what larger
theme could they point to? And how can Druskin help us find it? In his 1935 essay, “Death,”
Druskin spells out the difference between “time” as an ultimately deceptive linear process and
“moments” as the actual temporal units of reality as perceived by humans. He writes, “Time
brings death… Nor do I understand when they say that something exists in time. Something
exists in the moment, whereas in time it is destroyed and ceases to exist.”57 From a divine
perspective, time is an unbroken whole—a clock with no hands. From the human perspective,
however, time is the process of approaching death, which we do through a series of moments.
With this connection between time and death established, we can see in the old woman more
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than a metaphor for death, or a character with a strong connection to time. Rather, she herself
becomes a personification of time in the Druskinian sense—that is, a haunting force that brings
death. If the old woman represents time, other temporal aspects of the story “click” into place,
and a new central theme of the story emerges: The narrator’s anxieties around growing old.
In her brief time spent alive58 in the story, the old woman commands and manhandles the
narrator easily into submission. Both the woman’s actions and the narrator’s reactions take on
new significance when we interpret the old woman’s character as a personification of time:
‘Kneel down,’ says the old woman. I kneel down. But now I begin to feel the full
absurdity of my position. Why am I kneeling in front of some old woman? Why is this
old woman in my room, sitting in my favorite chair? Why didn’t I throw the old woman
out? … Pain in my shoulder and in my right hip bone forces me to change my
position…All my limbs are numb and don’t bend easily.59
On one hand, the old woman behaves much like time: She barges in uninvited, directs us
according to her will, and renders us full of aches and pains. In this scene, it is as if the narrator
undergoes the entire aging process in miniature, so accelerated that it feels more like acute
torture. Simultaneously, the narrator’s reaction to his treatment at the hands of the old woman
coincides with Druskinian notions of time. As we have already established, the narrator’s
appreciation of the handless clock shows that he already has some inkling, however vague, of the
true nature of time. Thus, when faced with the demands of the old woman, he is able to
understand the absurdity of his position despite remaining unable to resist.
I see this struggle with time as tied in with the main character’s anxieties around aging.
The first hint at this comes even before the old woman enters the apartment, when the narrator
claims that his friend Sakerdon Mikhailovich believes he is “no longer capable of writing a work
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of genius.”60 From the beginning, then, our narrator is wrestling with the idea that he may be past
his prime. The same anxiety is reflected in the two interactions he has with the would-be love
interest, referred to as the “nice lady.” While no age difference between the two is explicitly
spelled out, an age difference is implied in the way time twice prevents him from being with her.
In their first encounter, this interference is somewhat indirect: right before bringing her to his
apartment, he remembers that the old woman is lying dead on his floor. The second encounter is
even more blatant: While carrying the suitcase containing the woman’s corpse, he sees the nice
lady but is unable to run quickly enough to catch up to her. He attributes this to the weight of the
suitcase, which, in our working metaphor, becomes the weight of time—that is, his age. For good
measure, two young boys even stop to make fun of him after he tries unsuccessfully to chase the
nice lady down. For our purposes, this can be read as time, in the form of the narrator’s age,
literally weighing him down and preventing him from any sort of successful social (let alone
romantic) interaction. The old woman stands between him and the young woman. If the old
woman represents this bleak version of time, it follows that a central concern of the narrator is
growing old.
This conclusion helps us understand another one of the recurring motifs of “The Old
Woman”: disease and bodily decline. Perhaps the clearest example here is the group of young
boys who pop up at the beginning and end of the story. These boys don’t do anything particularly
out of the ordinary, but their noisy playfulness is enraging to the narrator, who daydreams about
inflicting them with tetanus. The explanation here is pretty simple: he’s a grumpy old man! This
is even clearer the second time the young boys appear, since this time they’re laughing directly at
him after he fails to catch up to the nice lady. This is not a ridicule of bodily decline so much as
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it is a reflection of the narrator’s own anxieties. He feels attacked by the boys’ youthful energy,
and spitefully dreams about their slow and gruesome death. A similar story plays out with
another recurring minor character, the man with an artificial leg. Here, instead of the narrator
himself hating the cripple, the narrator observes the ridicule of society. The man with the
artificial leg makes three appearances in the story. First, he is simply observed by the narrator,
with no commentary or context, other than the fact that “he is making a loud noise with his leg
and a stick.”61 The second and third times, the narrator observes the man being pursued and
laughed at, first by the six young boys, and then by adults.62 While the interactions with the
young boys reveal the narrator’s spite, his observations of the crippled man underline his fear.
He sees society laugh at his misfortune and feels the weight of the old woman of time pushing
him towards that same laughable state of grotesque bodily decay.
How, then, in this reading, are we to interpret the mysterious final scenes of “The Old
Woman,” in which the dead woman disappears and the narrator ventures into the woods to pray?
In his book, Daniil Kharms, Theologian of the Absurd, Neil Carrick finds a useful starting point
in considering the old woman’s disappearance as a misinterpreted miracle. He points out that
earlier in the story, the narrator essentially asks for a miracle, imagining that the old woman has
magically disappeared from his room. As Carrick writes, “The absence of any miracle soon
becomes apparent when he discovers the Old Woman is still there. Miracles, the narrator learns,
are not available on demand, even in extreme circumstances.”63 Thus, when the old woman
really does miraculously disappear on the train, the narrator mistakenly attributes it to human
causes rather than to God.

61

Kharms, 163.
Kharms, 177, 184.
63
Neil Carrick, Daniil Kharms: Theologian of the Absurd, 68.
62

Powers, 37
Keeping this analysis in mind and layering Druskin’s understanding of time on top of it,
these events take on even deeper significance. The real miracle is not just that God has relieved
the narrator of the unpleasant task of dealing with a dead body, but that God has lifted from the
narrator the burden of time itself. As we have seen in our discussions of Druskin, this is a key
element of transcendence. Humans are trapped in their perception of linear time, while God
exists in the eternal now. Humans experience time as a “certain defect,” leaving time as another
obstacle to be transcended in order to access the divine. This is perhaps paralleled by the
narrator’s physical setting as he moves from the confined, manmade, unidirectional enclosure of
the train to the vast, still, natural setting of the woods. Thus, the miraculous disappearance of the
old woman from the train is the closest we can get to a “rational” explanation for why the
narrator goes into the woods to pray. By removing his temporal anxieties, the narrator is a step
closer to divinity, to the noumenal world in which time exists as a single moment. The burden of
time, which a human could never independently escape, has been lifted from his shoulders,
revealing God.

Faith and Free Will
The readings of “The Old Woman” that jump out most immediately revolve around the
story’s plethora of references to—and parodies of—classic works of Russian literature. Framed
by the landmarks of St. Petersburg (Nevsky and Liteyny Prospekts, Lakhta, and so forth) and
centered around a young man’s killing of an old woman, the story clearly plays with such
classics as Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment (1866), Pushkin’s Queen of Spades (1934), and
Gogol’s Petersburg Tales (1835-1842).64 Many scholars have pointed to these aspects of parody
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and satire in “The Old Woman,”65 and not without reason. The literary connections are effective
in placing the story in cultural context and highlighting the clever and comic aspects of the work.
However, the existential aspects of the story are equally important. Some inroads have been
made in this direction, including studies by Neil Carrick and Alice Stone Nakhimovsky that
explicitly highlight the text’s religious dimensions. While both Carrick and Nakhimovsky deal
with religion in the context of “The Old Woman,” neither make use of the potential framework
provided by Druskin. If we read the story with Druskin’s theories on faith and free will in mind,
“The Old Woman” becomes almost a parable; a story of the narrator’s struggle to find faith.
Interestingly, Nakhimovsky does allude to Druskin briefly in her discussion of “The Old
Woman.” She writes,
The line of development that leads to Starukha involves two ideas: a belief in God closely
integrated with the details of everyday life and the expectation of a miracle. Both of these
ideas can be found in Kharms's work dating from the early thirties. They are also present
in the philosophical writings of la. S. Druskin, a close friend of Kharms and, like him, a
member of Lipavskii’s circle. Druskin's philosophy—in particular, the idea that through
prayer one can glimpse the transcendent state that lies just beyond the surface of ordinary
life—seems especially relevant to Starukha.66
Despite noting that it may be relevant to “The Old Woman,” that is the last we hear of Druskin in
Nakhimovsky’s chapter on the story. Instead, she focuses on the relationship between faith and
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the comic grotesque, asserting that the first arises through the second in Kharms’ story.67
However, the idea that she hints at in her introduction is correct, and worth further exploration.
Druskin lays out the idea referenced by Nakhimovsky—that the realm of divinity is
visible through prayer—across his work, but it features prominently in an essay discussed
thoroughly in Chapter 1: “You and I, Noumenal Relationship.”68 Although Druskin had not
written “You and I: Noumenal Relationship” by the time Kharms wrote “The Old Woman,”
Druskin’s essay provides an interesting structure for the process Kharms’ narrator goes through
in the story.
In “You and I,” Druskin is centrally concerned with companionship. He believes that
relationships between two people can reach a special level of closeness which goes beyond the
normal range of emotion and allows people to understand each other’s essences on a deeper,
mystical level. Through this active love, infused with love for God, a relationship can become
“noumenal.” These noumenal relationships, in turn, become the means through which humans
can access the divine. When an isolated individual attempts to locate their self or access a state of
transcendence and divinity, they are inevitably met with failure and despair, crushed by the
infinite and impossible responsibility to transcend the material realm that God lays upon His
subjects.69 However, with the help of a true companion (a “co-responsible assistant” in Druskin’s
terminology), the burden is lightened, and the impossible becomes possible. Thus, a central part
of the greater search for faith is the search for a noumenal companion. However, the mystical
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quality of Druskin’s concept makes it difficult to imagine how a real person could actually
achieve a noumenal relationship, or what form it should take. Druskin stresses that these
relationships are created “not by free will, but beyond willpower,” and that they, being
noumenal, exist partially in a world which is necessarily beyond the grasp of the human mind.70
Thus, we can imagine that the actual process of searching for this sort of relationship could be
fraught and ultimately unsuccessful. In fact, this concept, as well as its practical shortcomings,
are played out in Kharms’ “The Old Woman.”
When the old woman appears, she acts as a harbinger of the absurd, bringing the narrator
into an acute and painful state of existential awareness, comparable to what the German
existential philosopher Karl Jaspers refers to as “boundary situation.”71 To put it in the words of
Kharms’ narrator, he suddenly becomes conscious of “the absurdity of [his] position.”72 This
heightened state of existential awareness, in turn, prompts the narrator to search for faith.
This search for faith is connected to companionship not only by Druskin’s philosophy,
but by Kharms’ story itself. The search for faith and companionship plays out in “The Old
Woman” through conversations with both the younger lady and with Sakerdon Mikhailovich. In
both cases, he asks his interlocutor whether or not they believe in God. While the young lady
seems taken aback, she agrees that, of course, she does. While she may believe rather passively
and unthinkingly, the narrator remains interested in her, and tries to pursue her (albeit thwarted
by the old woman). In their conversation, the lady clearly expects the narrator's question to be an
invitation to his apartment rather than a questioning of her faith. In fact, the narrator follows up
his question about faith with the expected invitation, implying that her answer to his first
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question may have been a condition, a prerequisite to his invitation. Connecting the discussion
back to Druskin, it seems that by confirming her belief in God, she has identified herself as a
potential companion for the narrator, prompting him to remain interested in her.73 Ultimately, she
is unable to become his companion, as their relationship is consistently thwarted by the looming
presence of the old woman, time.
In contrast, the narrator’s conversation with Sakerdon Mikhailovich is less promising.
When asked about his belief in God, Sakerdon takes offense, refusing to answer and describing
the question as inappropriate (neprilichnyi). In response, the narrator seemingly retreated,
backpedaling his question and making an excuse to leave. In other words, Sakerdon has
demonstrated his unwillingness to be a true and noumenal companion.74 Thus, consciously or
unconsciously, the narrator tries twice to establish a noumenal relationship and find God through
a “co-responsible” companion. Both times, we see the narrator wrestling with the vagueness of
what such a relationship might actually look like — knowing that he needs a companion, but not
knowing exactly how to look for or create that noumenal bond.
In this stage of the narrator’s struggle with faith, Kharms touches upon another religious
idea that will be familiar to the reader from chapter 1: that of the relationship between belief and
the desire to believe. After Sakerdon refuses to answer the narrator’s question, he states that
“there are no believing and nonbelieving people, only those who wish to believe and those who
wish not to believe.” Sakerdon responds, “in that case, those who wish not to believe already
believe in something … and those who wish to believe don’t already believe in anything.”75
This dialogues rests squarely in the shadow of Druskin’s philosophical musings. Through the
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dialogue of his characters, Kharms plays with ideas discussed by Druskin in both “On Faith” and
“On a nonbelieving person.” In “On a nonbelieving person,” Druskin describes how, despite
faith supposedly requiring so much from humans,76 it is actually very difficult to describe or
locate a person who does not believe in God. This paradoxical situation in which the
nonbelieving person ceases to exist when placed under examination77 is reflected in Kharms’
conversation: By desiring not to believe, the nonbeliever must tacitly admit to the existence of
that which they hope to deny. In order for this to be true, of course, we must accept as fact that
the desire to believe or not is the same as actual belief (or lack thereof). This idea mirrors the one
expressed by Druskin in “On Faith:”
Strictly speaking, I cannot say: ‘I believe.’ I don’t not believe. By intuitive logic it does
not necessarily follow that I believe. But is this applicable to faith? If there is not
indifference or ill will towards faith, then ‘I don’t not believe,’ but if there is an endless
fascination with God, then this is already the desire to believe, that is, belief.78
As the conversation continues, it becomes clear that the narrator is struggling with the
elusive nature of faith. When Sakerdon points out that those who desire not to believe must
already believe, the narrator responds that it may be so, that he doesn’t know. Annoyed,
Sakerdon reiterates: “Well, what is it that they do or don’t believe? God?” Again, the narrator
struggles to pin down exactly what faith can mean. “No,” he says, “In immortality.”79 The
narrator feels the beginnings of faith, the old woman has prompted him to wrestle with it, and yet
he remains unable to pin it down semantically, unable to define it. To refer again back to
Druskin, this is an example of how the divine is absurd—that is, incomprehensible to logic and
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rationality.
When the narrator returns to his apartment, he faces a critical moment. He must attempt
to re-enter the apartment, and somehow deal with the old woman. Here, he enters into a crisis,
trying desperately to force himself to rush in and smash the woman’s skull. His fear and
uncertainty whirl around him, culminating in a vision of the woman crawling towards him on all
fours before he eventually talks himself down and makes it back into his room. In this scene, I
see the beginnings of another crucial stage in the process of coming to faith: The struggle with
free will. From Vision of Blindness and “You and I: Noumenal Relationship,” we know the
importance of free will as a topic of Druskin’s thought. In the previous chapter, we showed how
Druskin considers free will both an illusion and a prison, a manifestation of the rational mind’s
ambition to usurp God, that must be overcome in order to access divinity.
Standing outside his apartment door, the narrator is set at odds with his thoughts. He
freezes in the hallway, and despite telling himself over and over, “I can’t stand here like this,” he
remains rooted to the spot, unable to move. In the immediate moment, he is powerless, unable to
will himself to action. In addition to this immediate crisis of willpower, he faces a simultaneous
crisis of free choice. As he describes, “Something terrible had happened, but it fell to me to do
something perhaps even more terrible. My thoughts spun round like a tornado, and I saw only the
eyes of the dead old woman as she crawled toward me slowly on all fours.”80 In this moment,
Kharms shows us an extreme example of what Druskin would call the “prison of free will,” or
the constraining “situation of choice.” The old woman has entered his apartment and died, but
now her corpse must be dealt with. To leave the corpse alone is a practical impossibility, but
anything he might do to deal with the dead body seems just as awful, if not more awful, than the
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fact of her death itself. As it stands, the dead old woman exists in a sort of limbo state, in
between the real and the surreal. Any action he might take to touch the body or recognize its
existence to another person or authority would be an affirmation of her real existence, which is
terrifying for the narrator. Even more to the point, he has to choose what to do. Whatever
happens next will be his conscious choice, bringing consequences which will land squarely on
his shoulders.
Eventually, the narrator wrestles his thoughts into submission, at least enough to get back
into his room and start packing the old woman into his suitcase. However, throughout the
process, he is fully consumed by the project of maintaining willful control of himself. The
narrator’s constant struggle with himself—ordering himself around and arguing with his own
thoughts—reminds us that the boundary between rationality and insanity, sense and
senselessness, normality and absurdity, are frayed to a near-breaking point. The abject absurdity
and desperation of the narrator’s situation is overwhelming, and his mind has to work overtime
to keep up the illusion of order and control. In more Druskinian terms, his will is straining to
hold on, but he is nearing transcendence, nevertheless.
The final stage of the narrator’s journey to faith is his literal journey to Lisy Nos, where
he ultimately says the prayer that ends the story. In their analyses, both Carrick and
Nakhimovsky describe the moment of the old woman’s disappearance as a burden being lifted.
For Carrick, the disappearance of the old woman “liberates the narrator from the ‘sin’ for which,
as a character in a surrogate Dostoevskian narrative, he needs to atone. The narrator does not
require God’s intercession to relieve him of the Old Woman: She has already left him. Thus,
when the narrator prays, his action is made more dramatic by the fact that it occurs without
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warning or obvious need.”81 For Nakhimovsky, the old woman’s disappearance signifies the
replacement of one burden with another: “The physical burden of the old woman has been lifted,
leaving in its stead a spiritual burden, fear and guilt, that is all the more intense. Leaving the
train, the narrator goes to the woods behind the station. His attention is captivated by a
caterpillar; he gets down on his knees just as he did before the old woman.”82
Reading the story through a Druskinian lens, a third interpretation arises: If, as I have
argued above, the dilemma of what to do with the old woman represents the prison of free will,
then her disappearance sets the narrator free. Since the old woman has miraculously disappeared,
the narrator has been relieved of the necessity to choose. Druskin sees this as a crucial step
towards the divine. As he makes clear in “You and I: Noumenal Relationship,” “The slavery of
‘free choice’ can be overcome not through the denial of any particular [possible choice,] but
through the denial of the very situation of choice.”83 Thus, the old woman’s disappearance can
be seen as the weight and shackles of free will being lifted from the narrator’s shoulders, opening
the doors to the divine for him to walk through. We can also see the final scene of the story
through the lens of this quote from Duskin’s “On Faith:” “God is not in knowledge or certainty,
but in ignorance and uncertainty. Kierkegaard: Paganism is belief in the believable. Christianity
is belief in the unbelievable.”84 There is no tangible revelation of knowledge that leads the
narrator to accept God. No miracle occurs in the traditional sense, and there is no life-affirming
dialogue or monologue a-la Dostoevsky that would rationally explain why he goes into the
woods and prays. Complete removal from the situation of choice has somehow, mystically,
allowed the narrator to accept the uncertainty, even absurdity, of recent events. It is not that he
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finds God and thus, prays. Rather, it is in the moment of prayer itself, which arises in a vague
sort of mystery, that the narrator finally accesses God.

Conclusion
There is no single correct way to read Kharms’ “The Old Woman.” In fact, I think that to rely
too heavily on any one interpretation is a mistake. “The Old Woman” is so fascinating precisely
because it contains so much of Kharms—the comic, the ludic, the existential, the spiritual—all
working with, against, and in parallel to each other. This chapter is far from a full unraveling of
everything interesting this story has to offer. However, I hope to have shown here that by
grounding Kharms’ story in the context of Druskin’s philosophy, new lines of interpretation
arise. Through Druskin, we have cracked open two new aspects of “The Old Woman,”
understanding the woman herself as an allegory for time and reading the broader plot of the story
in conjunction with Druskin’s essay “You and I: Noumenal Relationship” to connect the
narrator’s journey and his reckoning with faith. These interpretations allow us to go deeper into
the metaphysical, existential side of the chinari absurd, bringing new richness and depth to the
text. Elements of Druskin’s work can be applied in similar ways to the other chinari authors with
equally fruitful results, and the following chapter will explore some of what Druskin has to teach
us about a very different text by the other most well-known chinar, Alexander Vvedensky.
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Chapter 3: Equilibrium, Error, and Divinity in Vvedensky’s “God May
be All Around”

Introduction
Alexander Vvedensky, born in St. Petersburg in 1904—just one year before Kharms and
two after Druskin—stands alongside Kharms as the other best-known chinar. While Vvedensky
remains, especially in the West, significantly lesser-known and less well-researched than
Kharms,85 he was equally/no less central to the group’s work. Druskin seems to have had a
particular affinity for Vvedensky: the two were childhood friends, having studied together as
schoolboys along with another future chinar, Leonid Lipavsky. Druskin also wrote more as a
critic about Vvedensky than Kharms, including a study of Vvedensky’s work completed in 1973
called “The Star of Nonsense” (Zvezda bessmyslitsy), which stretches nearly 95 pages long.86 In
addition to being the most widely known members of their circle, Vvedensky and Kharms had
similar trajectories in life. Like Kharms, Vvedensky wrote a mix of prose, poetry, and drama, but
was known in his lifetime as a children’s author, publishing primarily in the Soviet children’s
journals Chizh and Yozh. Although Vvedensky parted ways physically with the other chinari,
moving to Kharkiv in 1936, he maintained active correspondence with the others in St.
Petersburg (then Leningrad) and continued to write both for children’s publications and for
himself. Despite the physical distance between them at this point, Vvedensky and Kharms met
their tragic fates only months apart. Arrested by Nazi forces in September 1941 for refusing to
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evacuate Kharkiv, Vvedensky died that December on a prison train to Kazan.87
While the previous chapter explored one of Kharms’ most structurally “normal” works,
this chapter will deal with Vvedensky at his most challenging, focusing on his generically
confounding 1931 poem/play88 “God May be All Around” (Krugom vozmozhno Bog). This work
follows a character who is first called “Ef,” through what appears to be his own execution. After
his apparent death, Ef (now Fomin) finds himself in a series of strange conversations with
various unexplained characters. Eventually, the piece takes a markedly eschatological turn, with
a depiction of the end of the world:
Остроносов:
Все останавливается.
Все пылает.
Фомин:
Мир накаляется Богом,
что нам делать.
Ostronosov:
Everything halts.
Everything is burning.
Fomin:
God is heating up the world,
what are we to do?89
At the very end of the work, we are met with a fascinating and mysterious poem-within-a-poem
in which Vvedensky reinforces the idea of the end of the world and turns the ambiguous title on
its head, claiming not that God “may be all around,” but that only God is possible (Быть
может только Бог).90
While many of Vvedensky’s works could be fruitfully analyzed through the lens of
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Druskin, “God May be All Around” stood out as an appropriate piece to use for this chapter for a
few reasons. First, the work’s content revolves clearly around religious-or at least spiritual
themes: death, the afterlife, the end of the world, and the idea of God. Second, while Druskin
never wrote extensively about this particular piece, its final lines contain the term that Druskin
would later use as a title for his analysis of Vvedensky: the star of nonsense: «горит
бессмыслицы звезда / она одна без дна» (The star of nonsense burns / it alone is bottomless).91
Finally, the text is absurd on two levels: content and form. While some chinari works (like, for
example, Kharms’ “Old Woman”) contain a relatively conventional structure in which absurd
things occur, others are also absurd on the structural level: Sentences lack structural integrity,
words frequently do not fit logically together, and grammatical conventions are routinely broken.
Sentences are disjointed, and there is little in the way of logical narrative flow.92 Druskin himself
identified this combination of structural and situational/content-based absurdity as specifically
typical of Vvedensky’s work.93 All of these factors culminate in a text which can be productively
connected with both Druskin the philosopher and Druskin the critic.
In my analysis of “God May be All Around” I will engage not only with Druskin’s
philosophy, but with his criticism, using the analytical studies he wrote in the last decade of his
life to help unravel this challenging text. Beyond analyzing the thematic motifs of Vvedensky’s
work, this chapter finds that far from being an obstacle in our search for existential significance
in chinari texts, the semantic/structural absurd is a rich and important subject. By revisiting
Druskin’s concept of “a certain equilibrium with a small error” (nekotoroe ravnovesie s
nebol’shoi pogreshnost’iu) and understanding how he uses it in his analyses of Bach and
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Vvedensky, I use the concept as a lens through which to find meaning in the midst of the text’s
chaotic structure, positing that there is a spiritual, even transcendent quality to the structure
itself—that the absurd text can be thought of as a path to God.

Reading Musically
As we saw in chapter one, throughout his life Druskin’s religiosity was closely tied with
music—particularly with the music of Johann Sebastian Bach. According to his sister, Lidia, it
was Bach’s “St. Matthew Passion” that affirmed his belief in God, affecting him so deeply that
Lidia refers to it as a “second birth.”94 From Druskin’s diaries, which he kept from 1928 (shortly
after this revelatory musical experience) until nearly the end of his life, it is clear that Bach
continued to play a major role in Druskin’s thought. Druskin’s interest in Bach culminated in a
book, O ritoricheskikh priemakh v muzyke I.S. Bakha (On Rhetorical Principles in the Music of
J.S. Bach), which was published in Ukrainian in 1972 and then again in Russian in 1995. While
this book did not find its way into print until late in Druskin’s life, his diaries show us that he
was using Bach to draw structural and aesthetic comparisons between music and literature as
early as the 1930s. Already in 1936, he wrote that “in research there must be a number of
beginnings and endings, that is, there must be pauses and stops. The same is true in art, for
example, in the allemandes of Bach.”95 As Marina Lupishko writes, Druskin’s musicological
research in On Rhetorical Principles is remarkably detailed and granular. Druskin pulls apart
Bach’s work, identifying motifs and figures—usually only a few notes long—which he then uses
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to analyze Bach’s music more broadly. He isolates a basic, fundamental component of music,
analyzing it in great depth before stepping back to examine how it works with other figures in
the overall structure of the work. Much like the diaries, Druskin’s book is conscious of the
analogy between music and language. Druskin even mentions that his choice of motifs to study
relied partially on the fact that “precisely due to the simplicity of their construction, [they are
the] easiest to compare with the morphology of the word.”96
The traits of Druskin’s long standing musical analysis—attention to detail, atomization,
focus on structure and motifs—seem to have influenced the literary analyses of Kharms and
Vvedensky which Druskin wrote in his later years. Chief among these works is “The Star of
Nonsense” (Zvezda bessmyslitsy), written in 1973 and dedicated to the study of Vvedensky’s
work, especially the cycle “A Certain Quantity of
Conversations” (1936-1937). While it is beyond
the scope of this project to discuss “The Star of
Nonsense” in great depth, I want to stress its
importance as the first real piece of Vvedensky
scholarship. Important too is the analytical
approach Druskin takes in the work, which
resembles that of On Rhetorical Principles.
Druskin insists that his goal is strictly structural,
and strictly expositional. That is, he claims not to
attempt to explain anything. Rather, he sets out to

Figure 1: Diagram of Rug/Hydrangea (Kover gortenziya)
(1934) in Sborishche Druzei, 569

draw out, in his words, “the connections, alignments, parallels, oppositions, and implications” he
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finds in Vvedensky’s works. Like On Rhetorical Principles, this work is granular and structural.
Druskin provides a number of diagrams97 that lay out Vvedensky’s pieces in various visual
forms. While Druskin may claim not to explain anything, he still goes to a great deal of effort to
clarify the structure of Vvedensky’s gnarled works, untangling the mess of words to find some
concept, word, or pattern that he can use to create something approaching structural clarity.
Druskin reads literature musically, using the same analytical tools on both forms of art.98
In both On Rhetorical Principles and “The Star of Nonsense,” Druskin incorporates a
term which is already familiar to us from the first chapter: “a certain equilibrium with a small
error.” In these critical works, Druskin expands the concept’s application, seeing equilibrium and
error as created through artistic structure:
[it is] precisely the shifting centers of equilibriums, that is, the asymmetry of
Bach’s phrases, which create the ideal equilibrium … The perfect balance is
maintained… There is an allegorical equilibrium in the structure of the whole—a certain
equilibrium with a small error.99
“Shifting centers of equilibrium” form the basis of equilibrium and error for Druskin in his
analysis of Vvedensky as well. Describing the scheme of repeated motifs outlined in figure 1,
Druskin notes that, “these brackets, their movement from left to right, and their exact and inexact
repetition create the feeling of a certain equilibrium with a small error.”100 With this in mind, it
becomes clear that the search for repetitions and musical motifs carries with it all the allegorical
weight of “a certain equilibrium with a small error:” the search for selfhood, the separation of
humanity from the divine, and “catalyst for all of human action and life.”101 To search and
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examine the text’s structural patterns is to undertake a task with markedly spiritual undertones.
Druskin’s diaries show that he read “God May be All Around” in this manner. The entry
for August 26, 1943, is as follows: “These days I enjoy reading Vvedenky’s poetry like I used to
play Bach—unraveling hieroglyphs.” This is followed by a list of the “hieroglyphs in “God May
Be All Around,” arranged chronologically:
1. Ef and girl, motion.
2. Conversation about life, time.
3. Punishment of Ef—Fomin
Dead Man
4. The Feast at Stirkobreev’s. Duel.
5. Forest. Beggar
6. Conversation of Hours
7. Venus
Dead man (4 times).
Fomin and Venus. Is there light?
Dead man.
8. Fomin and woman.
Nosov, woman, and Fomin
Dormir, Nosov, dormir.
9. Fomin and the People
10. Fomin’s speech to the ancestors about transformation.
11. Fomin and Ostronosov—transformation. The world is being heated up by God
12. The corpse of the earth.
Dead Man102
Druskin declines, as he often does in his diaries, to provide any analysis for this sketch.
However, we do not need his analysis to see this outline as an invitation to create our own
musical sketch of the poem, reading Vvedensky’s structural strangeness musically in search of
elucidating themes and motifs. Using Druskin as an example, we can break down “God May Be
Around” into five “acts,” complete with a prelude, intermission, and finale.
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Prelude: The sacred flight of flowers
o «Солнце светит в беспорядке, / и цветы летят на грядке...» (The sun
shines in disorder / and the flowers fly to the garden bed)103
Act I: Ef and the girl, leading to the punishment of Ef and his transformation into
Fomin
o «Нету тебя Фомин, / умер ты, понимаешь? / Фомин: / нет я не
понимаю. / Я жив.» (You don’t exist, Fomin, / you’re dead, don’t you
understand? / Fomin: / No, I don’t understand. I am alive.)104
Act II: the feast at Stirkobreev’s, culminating in his duel with Fomin and the
transformation of the hall into a forest
o «Дуэль превращается в знаменитый лес. / Порхают призраки
птичек. / У девушек затянулась переписка» (The duel transforms into a
famous forest. / The ghosts of birds flutter about. / A long correspondence
plays out among the women.)105
Interlude: The conversation of the hours
o Including, among many other quips, «Пятый час говорит шестому: / мы
опоздали» (The fifth hour says to the sixth: / we’re late.)106
Act III: Fomin’s series of conversations. Despite no described motion, Fomin
undergoes a series of encounters with characters who challenge, embrace, and
guide him.
o Among a rotating host of unintroduced, mysterious characters, one called
Nosov proclaims: «Фомина надо лечить. Он сумасшедший, как ты
думаешь?» (Fomin must be cured. He’s insane, don’t you think?)107
Act IV: Fomin and the People, culminating in his speech
o «Господа, господа, / глядите вся земля вода» (Gentlemen, gentlemen, /
observe, the whole earth is water.)108
Act V: Fomin and Ostronosov, the transformation (burning) of the world, the
arrival of God.
o «мир накаляется Богом» (God is heating up the world) 109
Finale: The Star of Nonsense
o «Горит бессмыслицы звезда, / она одна без дна. / Вбегает мертвый
господин / и молча удаляет время.» (The star of nonsense burns, / it
alone is bottomless. / In runs a dead man / and silently erases time.)110
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Looking at both our sketch and the one provided by Druskin, a few elements become
clear. First, from our sketch, we see transformation (prevrashenie) arising as a thematic through
line. In almost every act, something or someone undergoes a transformation. These
transformations build up throughout the work, gaining momentum through their repetition and
through their scale, beginning with an individual (Ef—Fomin), followed by a location (Hall—
forest), leading up to the finale, in which the whole world is transformed in fire, replaced by God
and the Star of Nonsense. The spiritual implications of this theme are fairly straightforward. We
already see an eschatological bent to “God May be All Around” in its final act, as Ostronosov
and Fomin realize that “all is burning. God is heating up the world.” By the end of the poem, the
apocalypse completes itself, ending in the death of the world, the deletion of time, and the
existence only of divinity. While the end of the world does not appear as a strong theme in the
preceding acts, the repetition of the theme of transformation (and, for that matter, death) gives
the work a sense of continuity. The repeated transformations weave throughout the work, and
while they do not bring the whole piece unity—transitions are still abrupt and destabilizing by
traditional narrative standards—they tie everything together just enough so that it can still be
considered a whole. Thus, transformation is a theme, but it is also a motif, the repetition of which
strengthens the concept’s thematic impact in the absence of traditional plot structure or narrative
development.
Another key repetitive motif which Druskin notes throughout the acts is the phrase “In
runs a dead man.” Often, this line comes as an interruption of the poem, and is not logically
connected to surrounding lines until the very end: “In runs a dead man / and silently erases time”
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(Вбегает мертвый господи / и молча удаляет время).111 As is often the case in chinari texts,
it is difficult (and somewhat counter to the absurdist spirit) to look for an exact metaphorical
significance to the character. Perhaps, in keeping with the eschatological theme, the dead men
represent all the Dead of the world, raised up before the Last Judgement. Perhaps the paradoxical
state of a dead man who can still take action is a reflection of Fomin, implying the existence of
many such subjects, trapped in between the worlds of the living and the dead. Despite the
inability to pin down his precise allegorical significance, we can view his reappearance
throughout the story as meaningful in itself. Much like the dynamic we saw with the larger
theme of transformation, the repetitions of “in runs a dead man” build up to its final iteration.
When we see the dead man run in on the second-to-last line of the poem, finally ready to silently
erase time, we are already conditioned to pay attention. Up until those final lines, the dead man
remains ambiguous, and his mystery grows greater with each of his six unexplained appearances.
This lends greater finality to the moment when he reveals to the reader his role in the poem by
erasing time. One can even see the dead man’s destruction of time subtly reflected in his
repeated appearances throughout the piece: He seems to poke holes in the narrative, further
destabilizing the already-tenuous fabric of time. The dead man and his actions are given
importance not through description, but through repetition.
Thus, we have seen how thematic repetition builds momentum in “God May be All
Around,” preparing the reader and leading them towards the finale, when the world has burned
up, the star of nonsense shines, and “only God is possible.”112 However, there is still more to say
about the creation and violation of structural equilibrium in “God May be All Around.” This
same idea of applying “a certain equilibrium with a small error” to textual analysis also functions
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well on a more granular level.

Rhyme and Meter
Across individual lines and stanzas, structural integrity is constantly being created and
broken in Vvedensky’s work. The poem has a definite meter and rhyme scheme, but no one
pattern lasts more than a few lines. Vvedensky creates a structure and sets expectations for the
reader, only to break them suddenly by changing some combination of meter, rhyme, line length,
and other poetic elements. As an example, consider the poem’s first ten lines of dialogue, as Ef
addresses the imaginary girl:113
Здравствуй, девушка движенье,
ты даёшь мне наслажденье
своим баснословным полётом
и размахом ног.
Да, у ног твоих прекрасный размах,
когда ты пышная сверкаешь и носишься над
болотом,
где шипит вода, —
тебе не надо никаких дорог,
тебе чужд человеческий страх.
Hello lady motion,
you bring me such pleasure
with your fabulous flight
and the size of your legs.
Yes, your legs are of fantastic size,
when you, luxurious, sparkle and run across
the swamp,
where the water hisses
you need no roads,
113
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human fear is alien to you.

Vvedensky begins with a neat couplet in trochaic tetrameter, which he immediately undermines
in the next line. This third line can be read as anapestic tetrameter with a slight irregularity at the
beginning, although this irregularity smooths out somewhat if we take the final –‘e syllable of
the preceding line as the first syllable of the third line. In the middle section, the meter continues
to vary, with alternating between trochees and iambs and various line lengths. The final two lines
share the same first word, giving them a certain visual symmetry. However, as they do not rhyme
and do not share the same number of syllables, they are far from a couplet. Looking at the rhyme
scheme reveals a similar pattern: After the initial couplet, the rhyme scheme is highly irregular.
Lines 3, 4, and 5 do not rhyme with each other, but they do rhyme with later lines— 3 with 7, 4
with 9, and 5 with 10. Even here, Vvedensky refuses us the satisfaction of a pattern, leaving a
four-line gap between line 3 and its rhyme while lines 4 and 5 are five lines away from their
rhymes. Lines 6 and 8 remain rhymeless altogether. On the most granular level, then, Vvedensky
repeatedly creates just enough of a system to make readers think they know what will come next,
only to undermine that system in one way or another.
I find it helpful here to follow Druskin’s lead, creating a
visual sketch of the repetitions. Once we do so, we reveal a
clear similarity to figure 1 and render visible the certain
equilibrium with a small error. As was the case in Druskin’s
analysis, our analysis of rhyme scheme presents with enough
repetition to create centers, but enough irregularity for those
centers to shift dramatically. Moreover, this is just the rhyme
scheme for one stanza. Other stanzas have different line lengths

Figure 2: visualization of "God May be
All Around" rhyme scheme.
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and different rhyme schemes, denying repetition once again. However, the same basic principle
holds true throughout the piece: Vvedensky creates a certain equilibrium through recognizable
poetic conventions which are then pulled apart and distorted. It is worth noting here the
importance of a small error. Conventions are violated and stretched, but not completely beyond
recognition. The “certain equilibrium with a small error” only works if the equilibrium remains
visible through the error rather than being annihilated altogether.

We have already seen some of the allegorical power of “a certain equilibrium with a
small error” in Chapter 1, in our discussion of the essay “You and I, Noumenal Relationship.” In
this case, Druskin the philosopher, writing a decade before On Rhetorical Principles and The
Star of Nonsense, thinks of the equilibrium as the perfect image of God in which humankind is
created while sin is the error, an error through which humans separate themselves from God and
access the whole range of human experience. The small error connects two planes of existence
which exist otherwise out of reach from one another. The equilibrium of divinity would be
unreachable, except for a small error which humans can cling to. As Avdeenkov concludes,
The small error reveals that element which makes the whole world of things real for us.
The universe, the cosmos, and the earth present themselves as a certain equilibrium,
stable and constant. The laws of nature are unchanging, and they function in all places at
all times. However, the universe does not recognize itself, does not understand its
realness and stability. To understand this one must venture beyond the bounds of stable
equilibrium, introducing into it an element of error, inaccuracy. Humankind violates
natural equilibrium through his existence.”114
As argued in Chapter 1, this points us towards a broader allegory which the equilibrium
of the Holy Spirit is violated by Jesus, who, in his humanity and mortality, represents a small
error within that equilibrium. In all these cases, the small error seems to reach down from divine
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equilibrium to the imperfect world of human experience, allowing us to attain some measure of
revelation and transcendence. We can go on to say that any time the term is invoked, a
connection is formed all the way back to that ultimate allegorical significance of divine
revelation. In fact, Druskin the critic bears this out in practice by connecting the philosophical
term to his readings of artistic works. The structures, motifs, and repetitions in art—be it Bach or
Vvedensky—are so important to Druskin not just because they help see through the noise of
complex structures and identify themes. Rather, each creation and violation of structural forms or
patterns— “a certain equilibrium with a small error”—becomes a reflection or miniature
recreation of the larger equilibriums and errors of the universe. Even these small equilibriums
and errors contain some transcendent, divine quality.
Thus, through Druskin, we see that the Absurd text itself, in both form and content, leads
us to God. Our musical reading of “God May be All Around” reveals the prevalence of
transformation—ultimately eschatological transformation—as a clear theme and helped us find
allegorical significance of the “in ran a dead man” motif. Perhaps more importantly, we can now
see spiritual weight in the text. In the very act of reading Vvedensky, we create something
sacred, re-enacting divine revelation in miniature. It is worth a note here that Druskin saw
reading as an active and relatively creative process. In his diaries, he compares reading
Vvedensky to playing Bach, not just listening to it.115 In this context, the Star of Nonsense itself
comes to fill a religious-allegorical role, becoming the guiding star of Bethlehem, leading the
magi to Christ—the mortal, human God whose existence allows humankind to access the absurd
God which exists, in Vvedensky’s words, “all around.”
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Conclusion
This discussion of “God May be All Around” brings to the fore new lines of analysis that
hold interesting implications for other chinari texts and literature more broadly. On the surface, it
would seem that Bach and Vvedensky are completely different from one another—indeed, that
Bach is everything that Vvedensky is not. Where Vvedensky stands at the cutting edge of the
avant-garde, Bach stands in the center of musical tradition,116 the foundation of the canon.117 If
their works of art both contain the divinity of “a certain equilibrium with a small error,” what
makes the absurdist style of the chinari important? Why did Druskin associate himself with the
chinari and consider Vvedensky the greatest author of the 20th century, as opposed to someone
whose style more closely aligns with Bach and the baroque tradition? While the true answer is
impossible to pin down, the question leads to two interesting conclusions. First, in an effort to
find something that makes the absurd text stand out, it helps to look at equilibrium and error in
terms of levels: at the most granular level, we might have relationships that can play out over the
course of just a few sentences or lines of text, like the poetic meter and rhyme scheme we
explored earlier. At the very top, we would have the relationship described in Chapter 1, with the
Holy Spirit as equilibrium and the mortal Christ as its small error. In between these two extremes
lay all the equilibriums and errors we can imagine in art: all the plots and plot twists, patterns
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and variations, artistic rules and their violations.
Perhaps, then, we can think of the absurd text not just as something that contains
equilibrium and error, but as the “small error” itself, within the larger rules—or “equilibrium”—
of rationalism, therefore existing on a higher level than other art. Perhaps, part of the absurd
text’s significance is that its very existence cuts a gap in the plane of realism, allowing us to
imagine something beyond it. Regardless of whether or not the chinari style is actually “higher”
than other styles, Druskin’s ability to see the same pattern as a crucial function in both Bach and
Vvedensky points to the potential for “a certain equilibrium with a small error” to be applied to
other chinari texts and even to art in general. Perhaps we can take any piece of art and look for
spiritual significance in its asymmetries, seeing the very artistic process—the act of creating and
undermining symmetry—as sacred.
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Conclusion
From everything covered in the previous three chapters, I hope to make two broad points
particularly clear. First, that there is a vast metaphysical and spiritual richness to be explored
beneath the surface of the chinari texts, and second, that the work of Yakov Druskin is an
invaluable lens through which to examine this richness. By understanding some core components
of Druskin’s thought, we gain access to the philosophical ideas simmering beneath the surface of
the chinari. By using those ideas to analyze chinari texts, we bring them to the fore, giving way
to new readings and showing old texts in a new light: Seeing a search for faith in the narrator’s
disjointed wanderings in “The Old Woman,” and using “God May be All Around” in
conjunction with Druskin’s concept of “a certain equilibrium with a small error” to uncover the
sacred, transcendental quality of the text’s structure.
From all of this, what can we now say in summation about the role of God in the chinari
movement? Unsurprisingly, things remain somewhat mysterious. In a literary movement so
defined by its rejection of absolutes and satisfying conclusions, to produce a single answer is
beside the point. However, throughout the works analyzed here, we see a common existential
thread. Through Druskin, we see the chinari wrestling with the impossibility of reaching a
divinity which is already known to be far outside the bounds of knowledge, attempting to
embrace the absurd conditions of life and find something sacred within and beyond them. In
Druskin’s words, chinari metaphysics can be seen to revolve around “the desire to define one’s
place in life … not empirically, but transcendentally.”118
Beyond its interpretations and analyses, this project raises questions and connections
which demand further research. The idea of “a certain equilibrium with a small error” appears
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particularly fruitful as a concept and as an analytical tool, and I see potential for it to be further
examined as a stand-alone philosophical concept or applied to other chinari texts. The parallels
between Druskin’s thought and the concepts of European existentialists like Kierkegaard,
Husserl, Sartre, Jaspers, and others is also fascinating. Further examination of these comparisons
promises to be fruitful, and could help us connect Kharms, Vvedensky, and the other chinari
with the European existentialist movement more than they have been in the past. Finally, this
project has revealed to me the true scope of Druskin’s work. While I have made every effort in
the course of my research to read and cover relevant concepts for my analyses of Kharms and
Vvedensky, hundreds of pages and countless ideas remain unanalyzed. There remains a serious
dearth of scholarship focused directly on Druskin, and even then, almost none of it is in English.
A larger work on Druskin’s remarkable life and fascinating works, along with more English
translations of his writings—would be of great value both on its own and as a component of our
understanding of the chinari.
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